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Introduction
The art of military leadership is well studied and documented. Throughout the evolution of warfare, it could be said that while the tactics and weapons used to fight wars have changed, the basic leadership principles have withstood the test of time. This statement, however, may be primarily limited to leadership of warfighters on the field of battle. A major development since the end of the Cold War in 1989 has been the expansion of the environment in which the military leader, in particular at the operational level of war, finds himself operating. Quoting from the former commander of U.S. Central Command, retired Marine Gen Tony Zinni, -Today, we must engage in reconstructing societies even as we are still engaged in fighting-not after. And even when fighting has officially ceased, we continue to work to ensure stability and security so that complex economic, developmental, and diplomatic efforts can proceed. Today, we need integrated approaches to conflicts and security requirements; and all leaders-military, political, business, diplomatic-are crying for a more balanced application of the elements of power.‖ 1 If this is not an expansion of the military leader's area of influence, it is definitely an expansion of his area of interest. The major change being referred to above is not how a military leader deals with the servicemen under his charge, but the difference is the requirement to communicate and coordinate with other governmental agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and selected elements of the private sector. This paper will focus on the leadership characteristics and traits that are critical to the senior military leader at the operational level of war when dealing with the aforementioned organizations and entities. Given that the relative success of modern day operations is more dependent than ever on the ability to operate in conjunction with government and civilian organizations, this paper proposes that there are key traits and characteristics of senior leaders that should be used for selection of future commanders at the operational level of war.
Drawing on another example from General Zinni describing the changing environment, a comparison of escalation in the number of United Nations peacekeeping or observer missions aimed at defusing crises and building stability will be used. From its beginnings in 1945 through 1978, the UN conducted only 13 such operations, and in the following ten years no more were added. Since then, however, the count has risen significantly, with 47 operations being launched between 1988 and the publishing of Zinni's
The Battle for Peace in 2006. 2 Another aspect of these post-Cold War operations is that they often involve fragmented political authority, creating internal conflicts with more than two sides, and frequently changing combinations of allegiances. 3 Fortuitously, the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, which reorganized and integrated the military for joint operations, helped shape and focus U.S. military forces for these new challenges. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, dictates that joint force commanders (JFC) employ the resources of other governmental agencies in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve greater combat power and operational effectiveness through synergistic action. 4 Without a clearly defined chain of command between military and civilian agencies, the question of -who is in charge‖ became an immediate concern. While UPHOLD DEMOCRACY took place without the benefit of the more refined civil-military organizational relationships in place today, the combatant commander or his JFC should have intervened to ensure a path to success through unity of effort defined by clear lines of authority and coordination. The perception by after-action workshop participants was that there needed to be an operational level leader to coordinate and direct all agencies and forces involved, but there were mixed opinions of whether this should be the JFC or the Ambassador. 14 On a positive note, General Shelton was credited with taking the initiative to seek out and integrate activities with Ambassador Swing in Haiti, an action that proved key to the success of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. 15 Despite good cooperation, a weakness in understanding major issues was felt by the respective staffs because the senior leadership coordination was not conducted in a common -operations center‖ environment. Command and control, as well as arrangements for coordination and cooperation, should be carefully considered and established before an operation, rather than relying on ad-hoc solutions during the execution phase. Chapter VI of the UN charter. 23 During the following months, the UNAMIR peacekeeping force grew to approximately 2,500, consisting primarily of troops from Belgium, Ghana and Bangladesh, and was led by Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire. 24 Ethnic division between the Tutsi and hard-line Hutu ethnic groups continued to plague the peace process.
Following the shooting down of a plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on April 6, 1994, Hutu extremists began a killing spree against Tutsi and moderate Hutu citizens who had supported the peace agreement. Within three months, between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, were dead; 500,000 Rwandans were internally displaced within the country; and over two million Rwandans fled to neighboring countries. 25 Starting out as a classic peacekeeping mission to monitor an agreed upon ceasefire, the situation in Rwanda evolved into one of the worst cases of genocide in modern times. As a watershed event in the post-Cold War era of increased United Nations and international involvement, the Rwandan tragedy displayed how the slow policy development and approval process within the United Nations was unsuited for the volatile mission into which the situation in Rwanda escalated.
As a result of the devastating outbreak of ethnic violence in Rwanda, it could be assessed that the peacekeeping mission was set up for failure from its beginning because of the minimal resources allocated and the lack of a clear mandate for enforcing the peace.
Major General Dallaire's hands were tied from the start; however, any commander in the field must ultimately assume responsibility for the mission which he undertakes. After his initial assignment to the mission, Dallaire was able spend two weeks on the ground in Rwanda and produced a report on what he felt his requirement would be to conduct the mission. The report was submitted to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In Dallaire's words, -t hey pretty well agreed to what I had planned, but they reduced a lot of the stuff I felt we had to do in support of the mission. . . a lot of the emphasis of people looking at the report was on getting that thing to be a lowest cost possible and get out of there as fast as you can.‖ 26 In addition to reduced force levels and the lack of a clear mandate for intervention in the enforcement of peace, the mission would be sent forward without the capability to conduct thorough intelligence analysis. 27 Under these conditions, the commander assigned would be justified to stand his ground and not take forces forward if he did not believe they were properly resourced to achieve success; however, even Dallaire would later question whether he compromised too much and took too great of a risk because he personally wanted the mission so badly. 28 Relationships with counterparts in any organization become important leverage points with which to accomplish the mission. Within the United Nations Headquarters, Dallaire perhaps the best trained of all UNAMIR forces, in the ensuing days. 34 Dallaire's second questionable act was his request for a reinforcement of 5,000 troops four days after the plane crash and the eruption in violence. Dallaire felt that the additional troops would prevent the violence from spreading. The United Nations finally authorized this plus up of forces on 17
May, more than a month after the major hostilities began. The implementation was even slower with troops arriving after the genocide was over, a missed opportunity Dallaire still bemoans. 35 Leaders in similar positions to Dallaire will always be questioned with respect to their decisions either to follow the mandates from higher authorities blindly or to choose alternative courses of action that they know will protect the lives of their troops or the local improvement were certainly noted, the overall success of the operation was duly recognized for its positive outcomes. 41 Communications, both from the perspective of the external strategic message sent to the public as well as internally amongst military and civilian organizations involved, were deemed as a high priority by Blackman. 42 With regard to strategic communications, Blackman targeted his message to both the population of the affected nations as well as the United States to be clear in the role that the U.S. military was involved. His message conveyed that the U.S. military was only there in support of the affected host nations and that the host nations, in conjunction with other government and international agencies, were in charge. His message continued that the U.S. military would only stay until the host nations, OGAs and NGOs had sufficient capacities on their own to address the needs of the people. 43 Clearly recognizing that the center of gravity for the operation was the capacities of the OGAs, NGOs and host nations, Blackman made the decision to ensure all communications remained unclassified. This avoided disruption of effective cooperation with these agencies. While this caused compatibility difficulties for some military units, as well as exposing the operational security risk of major ship and aircraft movements, Blackman accepted this risk in favor of supporting the larger effort. 44 The redeployment of military forces and full transition of all efforts to the civilian agencies was also seen as a critical element of mission success. Blackman specifically steered his staff away from planning specific requirements as the triggers for transition. Instead, he referred to the transition as -Jell-O‖ and decided that a declining number of requests for assistance would be the best indication of a reduced need for military assistance. His guidance was that -mil itary staffs must avoid building exhaustive task lists for humanitarian relief that will lead their organizations down the dark road to mission creep and quagmire.‖ 45 Lasting effects beyond the lives saved and assistance provided in the areas affected by the tsunami include increased viability of American presence and influence in the region as well as unprecedented cooperation with various regional nations-Indonesia in particular.
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While any such effort is certainly a result of the efforts of the many personnel involved, the leadership provided from the top during UNIFIED ASSISTANCE had tremendous impacts on the final outcome.
Comparison and Contrast of Leadership Styles
The three case studies presented cover a broad range of military operations. More
importantly, these cases demonstrate that operational military leaders must deal with a wide however, are the long-term effects. In almost every case, the military contribution is only intended for the initial phases of an operation until either security is sufficiently in place or other agencies have built the capacity to take over. Impetuous, pre-emptive leadership from a military commander will inevitably alienate those with clear responsibilities and capabilities for the stabilization and reconstruction phase, that is the involved OGAs, NGOs and host nation. While success for a given mission may dictate the insertion of swift and decisive action for certain situations, long-term stability will only be achieved through a cooperative atmosphere that includes all stakeholders.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Modern day leadership challenges in response to the complex crises that the U.S.
military is more than ever being tasked to support go well beyond merely creating and integrating organizational structures. The best formulas for success also require a clear Interaction with a multitude of civilian government and non-government organizations has become an inherent aspect of nearly all twenty-first century military operations. Unfortunately, this interaction is not something military leaders have always planned or trained for in the past. Future victories, however, will depend on embracing and succeeding in this interaction. Developing and selecting the best prepared joint force leaders will be an indispensible element of achieving and maintaining peace and stability in the future.
